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Abstract 
 
The recent sub-prime crisis has highlighted the need for a better understanding of 
underlying bank risks. This paper investigates bank equity risk (systematic risk, total risk, 
interest rate risk and idiosyncratic risk) and credit risk for 84 financial institutions across 
15 European countries from 1996 to 2005 specifically with respect to off-balance sheet 
activities, bank charter value, market discipline effects and bank capital. While these 
bank characteristics are important in explaining bank risk we also find that civil-law 
country banks tend to be less risky than common-law country banks over the period of 
the study. Finally there is evidence of a decrease in importance of bank charter value and 
an increase in the importance of off-balance sheet activities for bank risk in the post-
EMU period. These results are robust to various estimation specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
The world banking sector has encountered serious downturns in the past few decades 
with the most recent example driven by the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis, first 
recognized in the financial press in 2007. Bank risk is a vital issue to regulators and 
investors and the systemic problems that followed the sub prime crisis provide further 
impetus to better understand the determinants of bank risk.1 While diversified investors 
tend to focus on systematic risk undiversified shareholders are more concerned with total 
risk including idiosyncratic risk, similar to borrowers and customers (Baele, De Jonghe 
and Vennet, 2007). Regulators (including implicit and explicit safety net providers) are 
interested in total risk, particularly given their responsibility for the stability of the 
financial system. Interest rates have also become more volatile in recent decades and this 
additional funding risk (Flannery and James, 1984) is certainly worthy of further analysis.  
This study provides insight into the impact of market discipline, off-balance sheet 
activities, charter value and bank capital on bank equity risk (total risk, systematic risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and interest rate risk) and credit risk. Analysis of bank risk is 
particularly important given the current level of European banking industry concentration 
and the decline in the number of banks since 1985 (ECB, 2005).2 It has been argued that 
formation of the EMU was the most important systemic change in world financial 
markets in recent times.3 This change has been associated with increased competition 
across the European banking sector. These changes compelled the banks to reassess their 
                                                 
1The aim of the paper is to analyze bank equity risks (total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk) and credit risk. It 
may be interesting to see variance ratio risk metrics, but it is not the focus of this paper.  
2 Indeed, the largest acquisition in the history of the European banking industry took place on 17 October 2007 with the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, through RBS Holdings, and its acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding NV. 
3 The establishment of EMU and the commencement of a single currency the Euro, was meant to ease trade, eliminate 
exchange rate risk, remove transaction costs incurred in exchanging currencies, enhance globalization through 
increased integration and competition along with maintenance and preservation of fiscal policy among the European 
markets. This modification has had a significant impact on the European financial system (banking industry and 
financial market) in terms of competition and consolidation (Francis and Hunter, 2004). 
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strategic orientation, leading to greater internationalization, greater geographical 
diversification and further bank consolidation, particularly in the euro-area banking 
industry (ECB, 2005). However, the deregulatory forces that increase bank competition 
may also reduce bank incentives to act prudently with respect to risk taking (Keeley, 
1990) and the following analysis provides further insight into the impact of this tradeoff 
following formation of the EMU. 
Innovations in the European banking industry such as growth in securitization, 
expansion in the derivatives area and changes in technology affect bank risk. However, 
while market making in derivatives is mainly limited to large banking organizations, 
small to medium banks have increased their reliance on fee income. By 2007, the average 
exposure to off-balance sheet financial vehicles across the euro-zone was around 6% of 
total loans and it has been reported that the 21 largest euro-zone banks had off-balance 
sheet exposures in the region of USD 359 billion, or 3% of GDP (ECB, 2007). Indeed, 
the ECB states that risks to euro-zone financial system stability had increased by the end 
of December 2007 and that the growth in these activities was of concern. Consistent with 
these concerns, regulators have proposed including off-balance sheet activities as part of 
the banks’ minimum capital requirements. A further motivation for this paper concerns 
the move to change capital adequacy requirements, particularly the new directive or new 
capital adequacy requirement.4 The new directive supports a risk-sensitive supervisory 
framework with greater reliance on market discipline to encourage effective capital 
allocation and increase competition in the European banking industry.  
                                                 
4 In parallel with the revision of the capital adequacy requirements regulatory bodies are considering revision of the 
directive on the deposit guarantee scheme. More importantly, the Lamfalussy process for the banking sector is still 
under review. This process includes regulation that can adapt to new market developments and practices and support 
integration, enhance competitiveness and strengthen cross-border cooperation among supervisory authorities 
(Thomopoulos, 2006). 
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This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study spans the 
period from 1996-2005, a decade of important regulatory change, particularly with the 
formation of the EMU in 1999, and it provides analysis of the factors that explain bank 
risk during this period. Second, to the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to 
analyze the impact of the formation of EMU on factors affecting bank equity risk, 
including bank equity interest rate risk and credit risk. Third, this study contributes to the 
market discipline literature with a particular focus on bank equity risks and credit risk. 
Fourth, in line with the theoretical literature, Calem and Rob (1999), we test for a non-
linear relationship between bank risks and bank capital.  
We examine the determinants of bank risk measures for 84 financial institutions 
across 15 European countries over the years 1996 to 2005. We choose our sample of 
banks to minimize the possibility of double counting.5 Further, given the likelihood of 
endogeneity effects in our bank risk determination model, we use lagged values as 
instruments, particularly for bank charter value and bank capital. We find that the level of 
off-balance sheet activities is positively associated with each of the five risk measures 
used in the study. Essentially, banks with greater levels of off-balance sheet activities 
exhibit greater risk. The results for market discipline, proxied by uninsured deposits, are 
mixed. While there is a negative relationship with systematic risk, a positive relationship 
is observed with credit risk and idiosyncratic risk. There are also mixed results for charter 
value, which is positively related with bank equity risk yet negatively related with credit 
risk. We generally find evidence of a non-linear relation between bank capital and bank 
                                                 
5 Consolidated statements from the Bankscope database are checked and each bank’s list of subsidiaries (reported in 
consolidated statements) is used to identify those banks that are reported separately as well as being included in another 
banks consolidated statement.  Banks that are reported separately as well as being included in the consolidated accounts 
of another bank as a subsidiary are excluded from the final sample used in analysis.   
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risk. We also note variation in bank risk between banks in common law and civil law 
based countries and between banks in euro-zone and non-euro-zone countries. Finally, in 
the period following the creation of the EMU, while the basic relationships still hold we 
observe a decrease in the sensitivity of bank risk to charter value and an increase in bank 
risk sensitivity to both bank capital and off-balance sheet activities. The results are robust 
to various test specifications. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and 
hypotheses that underlie the later analysis. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. 
Section 4 describes the empirical results and this is followed by analysis of the robustness 
of these results in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Financial crises like the sub-prime crisis highlight the need to better understand 
the determinants of bank risk, particularly in the European banking industry, which is 
characterized by deposit insurance and the accompanying moral hazard problems 
generated by this Government guarantee. Deposit insurance is designed to protect 
depositors, yet it also diminishes depositor incentives to monitor banks and to demand 
interest payments that reflect bank risk. Further, a flat rate premium is generally applied 
under the European deposit insurance schemes, which can lead to failure of the banks to 
adequately internalize the full cost of this risk and thus encourage sub-optimal risk taking 
behaviour (Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992; Merton, 1977). 
The possibility of risk shifting and the costs to society of bank failure are 
generally viewed as adequate justification for regulation of bank capital (Santos, 2001) 
though the disciplining effect of charter value provides an alternative to regulation. In the 
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next two sub-sections we discuss the relationship between bank risk and bank charter 
value and between bank risk and bank capital. We then discuss the impact of off-balance 
sheet activities, market discipline, with a focus on the level of uninsured deposits, and the 
impact of bank size in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. This is then followed by a 
discussion of control variables included in later analysis. 
2.1 Bank risk and charter value 
Bank charter value is defined as the present value of the future profits that a bank 
earns as a going concern (Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan, 1996). It has been argued 
that charter value helps to eliminate moral hazard problems in relation to an explicit or 
implicit safety net. Indeed, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) for Japanese commercial banks6 
and Anderson and Fraser (2000) and Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996) for US 
bank holding companies, identify a negative relation between charter value and total risk, 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Further support for this negative relation is evident 
in the work of Salas and Saurina (2003) and Gropp and Vesala (2004) who note that the 
increased European bank competition associated with EMU was accompanied by an 
increase in bank risk and a reduction in bank charter value. Similar results are also 
observed in the US banking industry (Park, 1994; Galloway, Lee and Roden, 1997).  
In contrast, other studies observe a positive relationship between charter value and 
bank risk. Bank charter value is argued to capture bank growth opportunities, as 
increased charter value may originate from more risky though positive NPV activities 
(Saunders and Wilson, 2001). Increased competition could also explain the positive 
association between charter value and bank-specific risk where it diminishes the 
                                                 
6Konishi and Yasuda (2004) find that market risk and interest rate risk is positively associated with Japanese 
commercial bank charter value. 
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disciplining effect of charter value (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Matutes and Vives, 
2000; Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000; Staikouras and Fillipaki, 2006).  This 
discussion leads to our first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis H1: There is a negative relationship between bank charter value and bank 
equity risks and credit risk for both euro-zone and non-euro-zone European banks. 
2.2 Bank risk and bank capital 
It is generally accepted that banks prefer to invest in higher risk portfolios where 
deposit insurance is in place and so the regulators require banks to maintain a capital 
buffer to ensure the banks can absorb losses in the event of bank failure. Indeed, Kim and 
Santomero (1988) argue that the development of risk-based capital regulation provides an 
upper bound on the probability of insolvency and there is some support in the literature 
for this argument (Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990; Rime, 2001; 
Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005). However, higher capital levels may induce banks to increase 
asset risk and the probability of default thereby defeating the original purpose of capital 
controls (Kahane, 1977; Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Gennotte and Pyle, 1991; Berger, 
Herring and Szegö, 1995; Blum, 1999).   
Calem and Rob (1999) propose a U shaped relationship between bank capital and 
bank risk. When an undercapitalized bank increases bank capital, risk levels tend to fall 
initially due to increased risk buffer effects and the effect of deposit insurance. But at 
higher levels of capital the institution may choose to take on greater levels of risk to 
maintain performance, particularly where the probability of bank default is thought to be 
remote. While there is little evidence of a relation between bank capital and bank risk 
(total risk, idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and interest rate risk) in early empirical 
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work (Saunders, Strock and Travlos, 1990) more recent empirical research identifies a 
positive relation between interest rate risk and bank capital while credit risk is negatively 
related to bank capital (Galloway, Lee and Roden, 1997; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; 
Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). 
Thus, while capital regulation is designed to reduce bank risk it is also feasible 
that bank risk may initially reduce with increases in bank capital, but as the capital buffer 
is further increased banks eventually increase their risk levels (Calem and Rob, 1999). 
Thus, we formulate our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis H2: There is a non-linear relationship between bank capital and bank equity 
risks for both euro-zone and non-euro-zone European banks. 
2.3 Bank risk and off-balance sheet items 
Although financial institutions are involved in providing traditional banking 
services and interest generating activities, the European banks have moved towards off-
balance sheet activities.7 This has allowed them to expand their revenue sources without 
altering their capital structure (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2003).8 But, off-balance sheet 
activities are expected to have an impact on risk (Angbazo, 1997; Boot, 2003; Boot and 
Thakor, 1991; Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson, 1986; Esty, 1998; Hassan, Karels and 
Peterson, 1994; Lynge and Lee, 1987). The recent increase in the amount of off-balance 
sheet activities and the escalation in bank failures have raised concerns about the link that 
exists between bank risk and off-balance sheet items. Certainly, it has been argued that 
                                                 
7 Examples include loan commitments, contingent liabilities, standby letters of credit, commercial paper, options and 
net securities lent.  
8 Banks with higher levels of off-balance sheet items are found to be more cost and profit efficient (Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2003). It has been argued that off-balance sheet exposures promote a more diversified, margin generating 
asset-base compared to deposits or equity financing (Angbazo, 1997). 
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off-balance sheet activities increase moral hazard problems (Wagster, 1996; Angbazo, 
1997) giving rise to our next testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H3: There is a positive relationship between off-balance sheet activities and 
equity risks and credit risk for both euro-zone and non-euro-zone European banks.   
2.4 Relationship between bank risk and uninsured deposits 
Uninsured deposits account for the largest share of overall inter-bank activity in 
the euro-zone, namely over 70% (ECB, 2005). In our analysis we approximate uninsured 
deposits using the sum of inter-bank deposits and subordinated debt, which are two 
important market disciplinary devices. Inter-bank deposits are the deposits received from 
other banks that are not covered by explicit or implicit insurance schemes. The market 
disciplinary impact of inter-bank rates is reflected in the default risk premium component 
of the rate (Ellis and Flannery, 1992); particularly evident with the dramatic shifts in 
inter-bank rates over the sub-prime crisis period. Given the existence of the default 
premium in inter-bank interest rates it is likely that less risky banks will be able to make 
greater use of interbank deposits. 
The market disciplinary role of subordinated debt9 is also identified in the 
literature (Evanoff and Wall, 2001; Estrella, 2000; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Morgan 
and Stiroh, 2001) though it is suggested that there are limits to this effect (Calem and 
Rob, 1999). Regardless, subordinated debt investors are sensitive to bank risk and this 
provides further evidence of the market disciplinary effect provided by this security, 
                                                 
9 The European bank subordinated debt market is concentrated. The largest European banks issue subordinated debt on 
average twice a year and the average ratio of outstanding subordinated debt to total assets is approximately 2%. This 
debt is traded in an illiquid secondary market, with few infrequent large transactions (Sironi, 2003). However, some 
effort has been put into the implementation of market discipline mechanisms which help to prevent banks from 
undertaking excessive risk. For example, in the early 1980s a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) was drafted 
by academics and regulators and forms part of the 2000 Basel Capital Accord II revised proposal. The importance of 
market discipline is clear in both the documents. 
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particularly for European banks (Sironi, 2003; Gropp and Vesala, 2004; Nier and 
Baumann, 2006). Thus, banks with high levels of subordinated debt are expected to 
exhibit lower levels of equity and interest rate risk.  
The proposed link between bank risk and uninsured deposits (both inter-bank 
deposits and subordinated debt) leads to the fourth testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H4: There is a negative relationship between bank uninsured deposits and 
bank equity risks and credit risk for both euro-zone and non-euro-zone European banks. 
2.5 Relationship between bank risk and size  
The European banking industry faced profound changes with the merger waves 
that followed EMU.10 The most obvious outcome of the merger and acquisitions that 
occurred in the period is a sharp increase in the average size of the banking organizations 
in the sample. This leads to an empirical question of whether large banks are more risky 
than small banks.  
While consolidation encourages diversification it may also result in greater 
leverage, leading banks to pursue riskier and potentially more profitable lending in order 
to meet the increased interest commitments associated with the increased leverage 
(Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). Further, large banks tend to be more internally diversified.  
This provides one means of reducing bank idiosyncratic risk for the banks (Stiroh, 2006; 
Konishi and Yasuda 2004) though it may also encourage banks to shift toward more risky 
non-interest generating activities (Saunders, Travlos and Strock, 1990; Boyd and Runkle, 
1993; Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan, 1996; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). Arguments 
to support the prediction of a negative relation between bank size and total risk are also 
                                                 
10 Staikouras and Fillipaki (2006) report that there was a major reduction in the number of credit institutions in France, 
Finland, and Ireland and while they noted an increase in the number of financial institutions in Greece there was little 
change in the German banking sector.  
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evident in the literature (Stiroh, 2006). Finally, larger banks may be more sensitive to 
general market movements, resulting in a positive relationship between size and bank 
systematic risk (Saunders, Travlos and Strock, 1990; Anderson and Fraser, 2000). Based 
on the above arguments we formulate our fifth testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H5A: There is a positive relationship between bank size and bank systematic 
risk for both euro-zone and non-euro-zone European banks. 
Hypothesis H5B: There is a negative relationship between the bank size and bank credit 
risk, interest rate risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk for both euro-zone and non-euro-
zone European banks. 
2.6 Other variables 
Other variables used in the following analysis include the ratio of loans to total 
assets, dividend yield and operating leverage. We expect the ratio of loans to total assets 
to be positively related with bank risk measures as the sample is dominated by 
commercial banks and these banks tend to be more aggressive in credit markets (Marco 
and Robles-Fernandez, 2005). We include dividend yield in our model for two reasons. 
First, dividend payments provide a signal concerning bank expectations about future 
income and second, risky high growth banks tend to retain a proportion of their net 
income which implies that more risky banks will pay less dividends (Lee and Brewer, 
1987), giving a negative relation between dividend yield and bank risk measures. Finally, 
Mandelker and Rhee (1984) and Saunders Strock and Travlos (1990) consider operating 
leverage in a similar way to financial leverage such that operating leverage is predicted to 
be positively related to our bank risk measures.  
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2.7 Macroeconomic variables 
There is no theoretical support for a particular relationship between regulatory 
restrictions and bank risk taking reported in the literature. In our study we use the 
Economic Freedom Index (EFI) to capture the level of regulatory restrictions in the 
market, with higher EFI scores reflecting a less restrictive regulatory environment. 
Higher levels of the EFI may either result in greater stability in the banking system 
through increased market discipline effects, though excessive risk taking is also a 
possibility in the absence of effective regulation (Gonźalez, 2005). We develop our 
hypothesis on the assumption that increasing EFI scores reflect removal of excessive 
regulation and more appropriate reliance on market discipline. In this situation there will 
be a negative relationship between bank risks and EFI.  
Bank risk may be affected by bank specialization. The bank specialization dummy 
indicates whether the institution is a classified as commercial bank or some other form of 
banking institution. Commercial banks are the largest group of depository institutions 
measured by asset size in Denmark, France, Greece and Spain where as in Italy savings 
banks prevail. The German banking industry is dominated by Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe 
which includes savings and Landesbanken. We expect that commercial banks will exhibit 
higher bank equity risk, interest rate risk and credit risk.  
Also, in our model, we include a legal origin variable. Civil-law countries 
generally provide weak investor protection relative to common law countries (LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1998). There is also some variation in the quality of law 
enforcement which tends to be highest in Scandinavian and German civil law countries 
and lowest in French civil-law countries while common law countries fall somewhat 
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between the two groups (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1998; González, 2005). 
We predict that civil-law country banks will tend have relatively lower bank risk than the 
common-law country banks due to the impact of tighter bank regulation in these 
countries. 
In countries where shareholder control is greater than managerial control we 
expect bank risk, specifically bank total risk and idiosyncratic risk, to be high. This is 
consistent with the notion that banks maximize shareholder value and that shareholders 
can diversify away the impact of idiosyncratic risk. Creditor rights are captured using a 
specific index while an anti-director rights index is used to capture the level of protection 
provided to minority shareholders relative to managers and dominant shareholders. We 
posit that bank systematic risk is negatively related to anti-director rights and positively 
related to bank total risk and idiosyncratic risk. However, we also expect creditor rights 
to be negatively related to bank equity risk, interest rate risk and credit risk. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
This study uses cross-country bank-level data, over the period from 1996 to 2005, 
in analysis of bank equity risks and bank credit risk. We consider a range of financial 
institutions including bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperatives and 
savings banks across 15 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom).11  
                                                 
11 While European commercial banks are a critical part of the European economy it is important to note that we 
specifically include publicly listed cooperatives and savings banks that offer similar commercial banking services.  
These institutions are important in countries like Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
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One contribution of this study is the careful selection of the banks from the 15 
European countries. The annual reports of each of the banks are checked to ensure that 
subsidiaries are not double counted. For example, subsidiaries are excluded from the 
sample where they are reported separately in the data base as well as being included in 
the consolidated statements of another financial institution. We extract bank level 
information, including the balance sheet and income statement from the Bankscope12 and 
the Osiris databases. We base our initial bank list on Bankscope which provides data on 
228 listed banks. From this sample we first eliminate ninety seven (97) banks due to 
inadequate market data or bank level accounting information. We then exclude financial 
institutions that are legally controlled by other institutions (subsidiaries) with a loss of a 
further 47 banks. This leaves 84 listed banks13 observed over a 10 year sample period 
from 1996 to 2005, giving 840 bank/year observations in our final sample. The time 
period is chosen to include the formation of EMU in 1999 and so we divide the sample 
period into pre-euro period (1996-1998) and post-euro period (1999-2005) in order to 
study the impact of changes in regulation on bank risks arising from the EMU. The 
number of banks from each country is reported in table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We use weekly individual bank equity returns, MSCI market index values,14 
market value of equity observations and 10 year government bond yields, all extracted 
from the Datastream International database. For comparability we convert the market 
                                                 
12The comprehensive data provided by Bankscope is consistent with the European Central Bank (ECB) declaration of 
the number of banks and is often used by the ECB in its cross- country analysis. 
13 Our sample is not survivorship bias free, since dead or de-listed bank shares are not available on either the 
Bankscope or the Osiris databases.   
14 In some cases we use the MSCI price indices where MSCI total return indices are unavailable. We find the 
correlation between MSCI price index and MSCI return index ranges from 96% to 98.99% and so this should result in 
little bias in our risk estimates. 
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value of equity into euro currency for non-euro-zone countries such as Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The independent variables 
include bank discipline variables such as bank charter value and bank capital as well as 
market discipline variables such as uninsured deposits.  Further definition of these 
variables is provided in the Appendix.  
3.2 Variable measurement  
The bank risk variables, broadly referred to as
tjiRISK ,,  in the following sections, 
cover both bank equity risk and credit risk. The bank equity risk measures include 
systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk and total risk. A two factor model 
(Kane and Unal, 1988; Flannery and James, 1984; Lynge and Zumwalt, 1980) presented 
in equation (1), is used in estimating systematic risk, interest rate risk and idiosyncratic 
risk for each individual bank. The risk estimates are calculated each year for each bank 
using the weekly return observations available during the year of interest. This provides a 
set of risk estimates for each bank for each year over the study period.   
itItIMtmiit RRR εββα +++=        (1) 
where itR  = weekly stock return of bank i  at date t ;  
MtR  = weekly return on the market. Based on the geographical exposure we use 
either the MSCI country index or the MSCI world index or the MSCI Europe 
index; 
ItR  = weekly change in the long term interest rate for each country at date t  and;   
itε  = residual term.   
 
The equity market beta, mβ , is used as a proxy for systematic risk and the interest 
rate beta, Iβ , captures equity interest rate risk. The equity market beta is estimated using 
the MSCI country index, the MSCI world index or the MSCI Europe index based on 
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perceived business exposure of the bank. Where the bank business is focused in one 
country, as occurs with the Danish banks, we use the country equity market index for 
beta calculation, Where the bank business is focused in the European region we use the 
Europe index and where a bank has a more international focus we use the world index in 
estimating its systematic risk.15 We follow the work of Kane and Unal (1988) and choose 
the long term interest rate in our model because long term interest rates are considered to 
better explain bank returns16. The natural log of the residual variance from the two factor 
market model is used as an estimate of idiosyncratic risk for each of the banks and the 
natural log of the variance of bank equity returns is used as a proxy for total risk. The 
variance of bank equity returns is also calculated each year for each bank using weekly 
return data available in that year and is defined as follows: 
2
1
2 )(/1 RRN t
N
tri −∑= =σ         (2) 
where 2riσ  = the total risk or variance of bank returns for bank i ; 
Ri = bank i return per week;   
R  = the average bank i return and; 
N = the number of observations.  
 
Bank credit risk17 is defined as: 
tjitjitji TALLPCR ,,,,,, /=           (3) 
where 
tjiCR ,,  = the credit risk measure for bank i  in country j in period t ;   
tjiLLP ,,  = the loan loss provision for bank i  in country j in period t  and bank i;  
tjiTA ,,  = the total assets of bank i  in country j in period t .  
                                                 
15 Systematic risk was also estimated using the local country index for each of the banks in the sample with little 
change in the results.   
16 However, there are debates on whether to use a two factor market model or to use a one factor market model. Due to 
multicollinearity between interest rates and market factors some authors orthogonolize changes in the interest rate 
factor (Flannery and James, 1984; Chance and Lane, 1980). Giliberto (1985) argues that this approach can bias the t-
statistics against one or other of the two factors. As a result, we follow Kane and Unal (1988) Maher (1997) and do not 
attempt to orthogonalize the interest rate factor.  
17 We could not use loan loss reserve as a credit risk measure due to lack of information in Bankscope database, 
particularly for Danish banks.  
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Endogeneity is likely to affect the following analysis, particularly with respect to 
bank capital and charter value. As a result, lagged bank charter value and the lagged bank 
capital are included as instruments for these variables (Saunders and Wilson, 2001; 
Galloway, Lee and Roden, 1997; Gonzalez, 2004).  
Charter value is the sum of the market value of equity and book value of liabilities 
divided by the book value of total assets following Keeley (1990).  Bank capital is 
proxied by the ratio of total capital to total assets. Given the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship between bank capital and bank risk, a squared bank capital term is also 
included in analysis. The key measures of market discipline are uninsured deposits and 
off-balance sheet activities. Uninsured deposits are the sum of the subordinated debt and 
inter-bank deposits divided by total liabilities. Off-balance sheet activities are proxied by 
the ratio of the total value of off-balance sheet activities to total liabilities. Bank asset 
management is estimated using the ratio of loans to total assets. The log of bank market 
capitalization is used to capture the impact of bank size.  
The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) is used as a control variable and it captures a 
range of factors that might affect the efficiency of the banking sector.  Operating 
leverage, defined in terms of the ratio of fixed assets (assumed to mimic fixed costs) to 
total assets (Saunders, Strock and Travlos, 1990; Galloway, Lee and Roden, 1997), 
dividend yield, bank specialization dummy variable (one of two values, 1 = commercial 
banks, 0 = other sample institutions), a legal origin variable (with a one of four values, 1 
= English common-law countries, 2 = French civil law countries, 3 = German civil-law 
countries and 4 = Scandinavian civil law countries)18, geographical dummy variable (one 
                                                 
18 We use a scaled variable for legal origin in an attempt to capture the variation that is evident across the civil law 
countries. 
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of two values, 1 = euro-zone countries, 0 = non-euro-zone European countries), creditor 
or shareholder rights index (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) and 
anti-director rights index (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) are also 
included in the analysis. Further definitions of these variables are provided in the 
Appendix 1.  
3.3 Empirical models 
Bank equity risks and bank credit risk are regressed on bank-specific and country-
specific variables using both pooled-OLS and two stage least square in our analysis of the 
determinants of European bank risk (as mentioned in section 3.1).19 The base model is 
described in equation (4).  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
++
++++++++= ∑
−−−−−−
tjititj
tjitjitjitjitjitjitji
ijt YEFI
SizeLTAOBSBCBCCVUD
RISK
,,,,1
1,,7,,61,,5
2
1,,41,,31,,21,.10
εγ
βββββββα  
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Where 
1.. −tjiUD  = natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j  
lagged one period; 
 
1,, −tjiCV  = natural log of charter value for bank i , country j lagged one period;  
1,, −tjiBC  = natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  lagged one period; 
1,,
2 −tjiBC  = square of the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  
lagged one period;  
1.. −tjiOBS  = natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  
lagged one period,  
tjiLTA ,,  = loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t ;  
1,, −tjiSize  = natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , lagged 
one period;  
tjEFI ,  = economic freedom index for country j  at period t ;   
∑ tiY ,  = year dummies (1997 to 2005) and;   
                                                 
19 In order to address endogeniety we use the lag variables as instruments in pooled-OLS regression. In 
addition we also apply the two stage least squares to address the simultaneity bias. However, we do not use 
dynamic panel techniques in our analysis as we believe it will not completely eliminate the endogeniety 
problem, but rather correct for the serial correlation.  
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tji ,,ε  = random error term.  
 
An extended version of the base model (equation 4) is also used in analysis (see 
equation 5 below). This includes the impact of operating leverage and dividend yield as 
well as various country specific factors that may help to explain cross-sectional variation 
in bank risk. The base model is expanded by introducing operating leverage and dividend 
yield as well as a number of dummy variables.  
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           (5) 
Where 
tjiOPL ,,  = operating leverage for bank i , country j at period t ;  
tjiDY ,,  = dividend yield for bank i , country j at period t ;  
jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or 
otherwise 0;   
jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French 
civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil 
law countries;   
jD3  = geographical dummy where jD3 =1 if euro-zone countries or otherwise 0;   
jD4  = creditor rights index and;   
jD5  = anti-director rights index.  
We list the instrumental variables that we use in the two-stage least squares regression in 
Appendix 2. 
While it is important to test for the general fit of the model it is also important, 
given the 10 year span of the analysis, to test for the possibility of structural change, 
particularly given that the formation of EMU. For this reason we split the sample in two, 
with 1999 being the year most associated with the formation of EMU chosen as the break 
point. This facilitates tests for structural change between the pre EMU period (1996-
 20
1998) and the post EMU period (1999-2005). Both pooled-OLS and panel techniques are 
used in testing for structural change using the following model: 
ijtttijttijtijt YXDXRisk εδββα +Σ+∗++= Δ          (6) 
where, tjiX ,,  = bank-specific characteristics for bank i  in country j  at period t . 
These variables are same as the explanatory variables identified in equation (2). 
To address possible endogeneity problem we use lagged values of market 
discipline, charter value, bank capital and off balance sheet activities as 
instruments in this analysis; 
tD  = time dummy, where tD = 1 for post-euro period and tD = 0 for pre-euro 
period;  
tjit XD ,,∗  = interaction term between each bank-specific variable tjiX ,,  with the 
time dummy and;  
tY  is year dummy variable.  
 
3.4 Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics for the sample used in this study are reported in Panels A 
and B of Table 2. The mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and 
kurtosis for each of the bank risk measures (credit risk, systematic risk, total risk, interest 
rate risk and idiosyncratic risk) are reported in Panel A of Table 2. The average credit 
risk value (the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets) is 1% with a standard deviation 
of 1%. The average equity market beta for the sample is 0.39, with standard deviation of 
0.50 and the average interest rate risk parameter is 0.17, with a standard deviation of 
0.20. The idiosyncratic risk and total risk measures are expressed in terms of natural logs 
though the underlying average standard deviation per annum is around 18% for total risk 
and 16% for idiosyncratic risk.20 
                                                 
20 Given a natural log of total risk of -7.35 per week then the variance is 0.000643 per week and the standard deviation 
per annum estimate is sqrt(0.000643)*sqrt(52) or 0.1828 per annum. Given a natural log of idiosyncratic  risk of -7.62 
per week then the variance is 0.000491 per week and the standard deviation per annum estimate is 
sqrt(0.000491)*sqrt(52) or 0.1597 per annum. These estimates appear reasonable, particularly given the use of a two 
factor model and the nature of the underlying distributions. 
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Mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis are also 
reported for the explanatory variables in Panel B of Table 2. There is some variation in 
the European bank off-balance sheet activities with average off-balance sheet activities 
amounting to 52% of total assets. Financial leverage, or bank capital, ranges from 2% to 
95% and charter value ranges from 0.87 to 1.79 with an average value of 1.02. Uninsured 
deposits measured as a proportion of total liabilities averages 0.16 with a minimum of 
zero and a maximum of 0.97.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The economic freedom index is obtained for each country for each of the years in 
the study period. The highest economic freedom index value is observed for Ireland and 
the lowest is for Greece. The creditor rights index ranges from 0 to 4, with a maximum 
for the United Kingdom and the minimum for France. The anti-director rights index 
ranges from 0 to 5 with a maximum value of 5 for the United Kingdom and a minimum 
value of 0 for Belgium.  
While not reported separately correlation coefficients are also calculated for the 
independent variables with just two large correlation coefficients evident in this analysis. 
The two correlation coefficients are for bank capital and size (-53%) and squared bank 
capital and size (-66%). Given the magnitude of these coefficients the following analysis 
was repeated both with and without the size variable with little impact on the reported 
results.21  
                                                 
21 No change was made to the base model, or the extended model, given that there is little evidence of multicollinearity 
problems in the data. 
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4. Empirical results 
This section discusses the results from analysis of the determinants of bank equity 
risk and credit risk. Section 4.1 presents the results for our base model (equation 4) and 
the extended model (equation 5) using both pooled-OLS regression and two stage least 
squares regression. Section 4.2 reports the results from tests for structural change which 
focus on the formation of EMU and the impact of the change on risk factors.  
4.1 Effect of risk factors 
The results for the pooled-OLS and two stage least squares estimation of the base 
model (Equations 4) and the extended model (Equation 5) are reported in panel A and 
panel B of Table 3.22 From Panel A of Table 3 our findings show that bank charter value 
is negatively related with bank credit risk. This is consistent with the disciplining effect 
of bank charter value.23Yet, under both types of estimation method we find a positive and 
significant relationship between bank charter value and both idiosyncratic risk and total 
risk. While this is consistent with Saunders and Wilson (2001) it is inconsistent with the 
findings of Konishi and Yasuda (2004) for Japanese commercial banks and Anderson and 
Fraser (2000), Galloway, Lee and Roden (1997) and Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 
(1996) for US bank holding companies. This result is also contrary to hypothesis H1. 
There is also a positive and significant relationship between systematic risk and bank 
charter value. One possible explanation for the variation in coefficient sign is that charter 
value enhancing expansion took place over the study period and this may have resulted in 
increased European bank systematic and idiosyncratic risk (Konishi and Yasuda 2004, 
                                                 
22 This pooled-OLS analysis includes year dummies and the joint F-test for the year dummies is statistically significant 
at 5% level or better.  
23 However under two-stage least squares regression we find a positive and statistically insignificant result. 
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Saunders and Wilson 2001, Demsetz and Strahan 1996 and Hughes, Lang, Mester and 
Moon 1996).  
The other bank discipline variable, bank capital, shows a negative relationship 
with all risk measures. Yet the statistical significance is observed only for systematic risk 
under pooled-OLS and for idiosyncratic risk and total risk under two-stage least squares 
estimation. It emerges that the higher the bank capital buffer the lower the bank risk, 
consistent with the argument that careful management of bank capital can facilitate 
stability of the banking system (Kim and Santomero 1988, Furlong and Keeley 1987, 
1989 and Keeley and Furlong 1990). The relationship between bank capital and risk 
appears to be non-linear given the statistically significant squared bank capital 
coefficients, in line with Calem and Rob (1999), Blum (1999) and Gennotte and Pyle 
(1991). This result also supports hypotheses H2A and H2B.  
There is evidence of a positive relation between off-balance sheet activity and 
credit risk, systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk under both types of 
estimations. The results are significant at 5% level or better for these risk measures. This 
outcome supports hypothesis H3. The result is consistent with the argument that while 
off-balance sheet activities generate fee income for banks they also create balance sheet, 
or portfolio, risk. This provides some justification for the concern expressed by bank 
regulators about the risks associated with off-balance sheet activities. This is particularly 
pertinent given the Basel Accord I & II proposals to treat off-balance sheet activities as 
risky and include them in the risk-weighted bank capital ratio calculation.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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The market discipline proxy, uninsured deposits, is negatively related with 
systematic risk and positively related with both credit risk24 and idiosyncratic risk. While 
the results for systematic risk support hypothesis H4, the hypothesis is not supported for 
the other risk measures. The negative systematic risk relationship suggests that taking on 
further subordinated debt may be a superior strategy with respect to market discipline, 
reducing the impact of explicit or implicit deposit insurance. However, the positive 
relationship with credit risk and idiosyncratic risk suggest that increasing the level of 
longer maturity liabilities such as subordinated debt could also result in bank investments 
that carry greater levels of idiosyncratic, rather than systematic risk (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). While idiosyncratic risk and individual bank credit risk might be diversified away 
by the investor, the bank still needs to manage these risks if it is to remain solvent. 
The other variable of specific interest is loans to total assets. Our findings for 
credit risk support our hypothesis that loan to total assets is positively associated with 
bank credit risk. However, loans to total assets is negatively related to systematic risk and 
total risk. This could come about where additional loans taken on by the banks are less 
risky than the existing pool of assets on bank balance sheets, resulting in decreased 
overall equity risk levels.25 
Size is negatively related to credit risk, idiosyncratic and interest rate risk 
consistent with Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996) and Demsetz and Strahan 
(1997) but is statistically significant for the credit risk under both estimations and 
statistically significant idiosyncratic risk under two stage least squares regression. The 
relationship between systematic risk and size and total risk (under pooled OLS estimation 
                                                 
24 The relationship between credit risk and market discipline is positive but it statistically insignificant for two-stage 
least squares estimation.  
25 We leave further analysis of this question to future research. 
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only) and size is positive and significant at 1% level, consistent with Saunder, Strock and 
Travlos (1990), Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996) and Anderson and Fraser 
(2000). Hence, this relationship explains bank risk taking are consistent with the “too-big 
–to-fail-policy”, where large banks have greater incentive to take higher risk as they 
enjoy a comprehensive safety net. The size effect on bank risk measures supports 
hypotheses H5A and H5B.  
Finally, the economic freedom index is negatively associated with all risk 
measures and is statistically significant at 5% level or better under pooled-OLS 
estimation. This outcome supports hypothesis H6, implying that greater levels of 
economic freedom, particularly in terms of lower levels of regulation and government 
intervention, generate lower bank equity risk and credit risk. Yet, under two stage least 
squares EFI is only statistically significant for systematic risk. 
The results for the extended model are reported in panel B of Table 3. Here, we 
focus on the results for the additional variables as the coefficients for the base model 
variables are little changed. There is a positive relationship between dividend yield and 
systematic risk under both estimations. Moreover, under two-stage least square 
estimation we find credit risk idiosyncratic risk show a positive and statistically 
significant result. These are unexpected though it may simply reflect the link between 
risk and expected return where dividend yield has some predictive power over expected 
return.26 While statistically insignificant, the relationship with interest rate risk measure is 
negative, which is more in line with expectations (Lee and Brewer, 1987).  
                                                 
26 Ang and Bekaert (2007) revisit the question of whether dividend yield predicts expected returns. They find the 
predictive power is not as pervasive as initially thought, particularly when compared with the short rate for example. 
Nevertheless, they do find some evidence of dividend yield predictive power over expected returns.  
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We find operating leverage has a negative (statistically significant at 5% or 
higher) effect on bank systematic risk and interest rate risk. This is an unexpected 
outcome given the work of Saunders, Travlos and Strock (1990) and Galloway, Lee and 
Roden (1997). Mandelker and Rhee (1984) argue that operating leverage acts in a similar 
manner to financial leverage, in increasing risk. This negative relationship between 
operating leverage and equity risk could be explained in terms of financial leverage 
effects. Increasing income producing assets, all else held constant, could reduce financial 
leverage and thus reduce financial risk. If this occurs then there may be a negative 
relation between operating leverage and equity risk measures. We find a positive and 
significant relationship between credit risk and operating leverage consistent with 
Mandelker and Rhee (1984).  
We also find that commercial banks ( )1D exhibit greater credit risk, systematic risk 
total risk and interest rate risk under both estimation methods. The results are statistically 
significant for credit risk, systematic risk and total risk. Given the negative legal origin 
( )2D  coefficients, common-law country banks exhibit greater credit risk, systematic risk 
and total risk than the more heavily regulated civil-law country banks. The higher levels 
of common-law country bank risk may reflect the greater level of market discipline 
operating in civil law countries which acts to constrain bank risk levels. The estimated 
coefficients for the geographical dummy ( )3D  variable suggests that euro-zone country 
banks show lower levels of credit risk and systematic risk while exhibiting higher levels 
of total risk, interest rate risk and idiosyncratic risk. The results are statistically 
significant at 5% level or better. 
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Enforcement of creditor rights (creditor rights variable) and anti-director rights 
(anti-director rights variable) seem to be important in explaining the variation in bank 
credit risk (positive), total risk (negative) and idiosyncratic risk (negative). The other risk 
measures show a negative association with creditor rights consistent with Nier and 
Baumann (2006). We find a statistically significant positive association between anti-
director rights and bank total risk, interest rate risk and idiosyncratic risk which supports 
our hypothesis (La Porta et al 1998). However, systematic and credit risks are negatively 
associated with anti-director rights at 5% or higher significance level. 
4.2 Impact of Economic Monetary Union (EMU) on bank risks 
The impact of EMU on European bank risk is discussed in this section with 
analysis based on equation (6) and results reported in Table 4. Both pooled-OLS and 
panel techniques are applied in this analysis but since the Lagrange-multiplier test 
supports the pooled-OLS approach we do not report the results from the panel 
techniques.27 We employ Wald tests to assess the possibility of structural change with 
EMU. However, the tests confirm the existence of structural change for all but the total 
risk and the idiosyncratic risk models, suggesting that the formation of EMU had an 
important impact on bank credit risk, interest rate risk and systematic risk for the sample 
of banks used in this study. The magnitude of the charter value coefficients have fallen 
dramatically, even though not always statistically significantly, for all risk measure 
models. This outcome is interpreted in terms of the decline in the importance of charter 
value with the formation of EMU and increasing levels of competition. The most 
statistically significant decline is observed for charter value relative to systematic risk 
with a change in the coefficient of -1.431. 
                                                 
27 Results are available upon request.  
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[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
It is also apparent that the non-linear relationship between bank capital and 
systematic risk may be driven by the post-EMU period as none of the coefficients for 
bank capital and only two of the coefficients for squared bank capital are statistically 
significant in the pre-EMU period. Further, the positive relationship between credit risk 
and off-balance sheet activities may be driven by the pre-EMU period. For the remainder 
of the risk measures we generally find a statistically insignificant increase in the effect of 
off-balance sheet activities on risk with the formation of EMU. The size variable has 
increased in importance following 1999 for all risk measures while being statistically 
significant for credit risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. The loan-to-total asset ratio 
coefficient also generally increases after 1999 with respect to bank equity risk though the 
change in the coefficient is not statistically significant. Finally, the economic freedom 
index coefficient shows a statistically significant decline with respect to credit risk and 
interest rate risk after 1999. We also find the year dummies to be jointly significant for all 
risk measures except for systematic risk. 
In summary, the formation of the EMU has had an impact on the sensitivity of 
bank risk to some of the key variables included in our model. While some of the variation 
is due to changes in sensitivity to bank capital the remaining variation is associated more 
with changes in the magnitude of coefficients rather than their sign (See Section 4.1). 
5. Robustness analysis 
We conduct a number of robustness tests. First, we carry out year-by-year cross-
sectional analysis, using both the base and the extended models (equations 4 and 5), to 
ensure that our results are not driven by spurious time series correlation between the 
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various measures of bank risk and the explanatory variables. Second, we re-run the 
models excluding the 36 Danish banks from our original sample, as this group of banks 
accounts for a substantial proportion of the bank sample. Our findings are little changed 
with this additional analysis.  Similarly, we re-run the base model and extended model 
after eliminating the three (3) German banks from our sample because of the unique 
characteristics of the German banking system. However, our results remain little 
changed. 28 
In order to allow for the possibility of unobservable heterogeneity in the data we 
use panel data analysis methods, random effects and fixed effects, in estimation of base 
model and extended model (equations (4) and (5)).29 In general, while there fewer 
statistically significant coefficients, the coefficient signs are generally consistent with 
those reported in Section 4.1. We also construct an unbalanced panel of the 118 banks 
available for analysis including banks with incomplete data, giving a total of 1088 
observations.  There is little change from the results reported in Section 4.1. Given the 
unusual nature of the German banking industry (Haq and Heaney, 2009), we construct 
another unbalanced panel excluding German banks from our sample with little change in 
the results. 30 
The pooled-OLS analysis that was used in Section 4.1 is repeated using 
proportional risk measures, where systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and interest rate risk 
                                                 
28 The results are available upon request.  
29 The appropriateness of the pooled-OLS and fixed effects is estimated using F-tests, while the choice between random 
effects and pooled-OLS is tested on the basis of the Breusche Pagan Langrange multiplier (LM) test. The Hausman test 
is used in comparison of the fixed effects and random effects models. When time invariant dummy variables are 
included in the estimated model, the application of fixed effects is not possible and in such cases the alternative models 
used in estimation are pooled-OLS and random effects with selection of the most appropriate based on the Langrange 
multiplier (LM) test. 
30 The results are available upon request.  
 30
are measured as a proportion of total equity market risk31 rather than actual risk 
estimates.32 Again, the original results are robust to this alternative risk measure with two 
exceptions.  The first is a negative relationship between charter value and idiosyncratic 
risk and the second is a negative relationship between off-balance sheet activities and 
idiosyncratic risk. Both results are statistically significant at 1% significance level and 
both are inconsistent with the results discussed above in section 4.1.33 We leave further 
discussion of these exceptions to future research. Finally, we re-run the analysis with the 
inclusion of various interaction terms to test for the possibility of more complex 
relationships explaining the various measures of bank risk. There is little of statistical 
interest gained from this additional analysis except for a positive and significant 
interaction between bank size and bank charter value. It seems that for a given level of 
bank charter value, larger banks are more sensitive to credit risk, systematic risk, total 
risk and idiosyncratic risk than smaller banks.34 
6. Conclusion 
In this study we analyze the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk 
measures. Our sample consists of 84 listed financial institutions across 15 European 
countries from the period 1996-2005. We regress five risk measures, total risk, systematic 
risk, interest rate risk, idiosyncratic risk and credit risk, on a number of bank- specific and 
                                                 
31 itItIMtmiit RRR εββα +++=  ;  
222222 )cov(2 εσββσβσβσ +++= ImImIImmri RR  
222 / rimm σσβ=risk total  /risk systematic ; 222 / riII σσβ=risk total  /risk rateInterest , 
22 / riσσε=risk total  /risk icIdisyncrat  
32 We thank Mark Flannery for this suggestion.   
33 For the sake of brevity the results are not reported but are available upon request.  
34 The results are available upon request.  
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country-specific variables. We initially apply pooled-OLS though the results of panel 
analysis are generally consistent with the initial pooled-OLS results.  
We find that off-balance sheet activities are in general positively related to the 
risk measures. This result is consistent with expectations and is robust to the various 
specifications reported above. Thus, increasing the level of off-balance activities 
increases bank risks. This result has important policy implications and certainly justifies 
the inclusion of this data in bank balance sheets. 
Further, consistent with our expectations, we find uninsured deposits are 
negatively related with bank systematic risk. This is consistent with the existence of 
market discipline effect though there is only weak evidence to support market discipline 
effects for the remaining risk measures. This is an important result because it suggests 
that the level of uninsured deposits should have a direct impact on bank share price 
through its impact on systematic risk. 
The other important factor is bank charter value. We find a negative and 
significant relationship between charter value and credit risk, which implies a charter 
value discipline effect with respect to bank credit risk. However, our findings also 
provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between charter 
value and bank equity risk. This relationship is contrary to our expectations. One possible 
explanation is that this relationship reflects the growth opportunities implicit in charter 
value. 
We find evidence to support the argument that bank capital is non-linearly related 
to bank risk though this result is sensitive to estimation method and to period choice (pre 
versus post EMU). There is considerable variation in the bank size coefficients with a 
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positive relationship between size and bank systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic 
risk and a negative relation with bank credit risk. We also note variation in the various 
measure of bank risk between common law country and civil law country banks and 
between euro-zone and non-euro-zone banks. These findings are statistically significant 
at 5% significance level or better. There is also some evidence of an interaction between 
charter value and size. 
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Appendix 1 
Definition of selected variables  
 
Variables Definition Reference Source 
Dependent variables     
Total risk  standard deviation of the bank return Konishi and Yasuda 2004, Anderson 
and Fraser 2000, Kane and Unal 1988, 
Flannery and James 1984 and Lynge 
and Zumwalt 1980 
Datastream 
Interest rate risk  estimated from equation 1  Konishi and Yasuda 2004, Anderson 
and Fraser 2000, Kane and Unal 1988, 
Flannery and James 1984 and Lynge 
and Zumwalt 1980 
Datastream 
Systematic risk  estimated from equation 1 Konishi and Yasuda 2004, Anderson 
and Fraser 2000, Kane and Unal 1988, 
Flannery and James 1984 and Lynge 
and Zumwalt 1980 
Datastream 
Idiosyncratic risk variance of the residual from the two index model from equation 1 Konishi and Yasuda 2004, Anderson 
and Fraser 2000, Kane and Unal 1988, 
Flannery and James 1984 and Lynge 
and Zumwalt 1980 
Datastream 
Credit risk  loan loss provision /total liabilities = ex-post realized risk   Bankscope and Osiris 
Bank- specific variables    
Operating leverage fixed assets/total assets  Saunders, Strock and Travlos 1990 and 
Galloway, Lee and Roden 1997. 
Bankscope 
Dividend yield  dividend per share divided by price per share  Datastream 
Uninsured deposits (subordinated debt+ inter-bank deposits)/total liabilities Nier and Baumann 2004 Bankscope and Osiris 
Charter value (endogenous 
variable)  
(market value of equity +book value of liabilities)/book value of total assets  Keeley 1990 and Konishi and Yasuda 
2003 
Bankscope and Osiris 
Bank capital or financial 
leverage (endogenous 
variable) 
Capital or equity/total assets  Berger, Herring and Szegö 1995, 
Saunders, Strock and Travlos 1990 
Bankscope and Osiris 
Bank capital squared 
(endogenous variable) 
(Capital or equity/total assets)2 Calem and Rob 1999 Bankscope and Osiris 
Off-balance sheet items This includes contingent liabilities, loan commitments, standby letters of 
credit,(acceptances, guarantees, documentary and commercial Letter of 
credits and operating leasing commitments) 
Angbazo 1997 Bankscope and Osiris 
Loans/total assets Total loans/total assets   Bankscope and Osiris 
Size  Natural logarithm of total market value of equity  Datastream 
Country specific  variables    
Economic freedom index  We take the overall score for our analysis. The score includes: business Gonźalez 2005 Heritage foundation, 
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freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, freedom from government, monetary 
freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom 
from corruption and labor freedom. 
WBRS, Barth et al 
2001 
Ownership dummy (D1) D1=1 if commercial banks and D1=0 otherwise   
Legal origin (D2) The legal origin dummy. D=1 for common law countries or English origin 
countries, D=2 for French civil-law countries, D=3 German civil law 
countries and D=4 for Scandinavian civil law countries. 
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998 and Gonźalez 2005.  
 
 
Geographical proximity (D3) D3=1 if euro zone countries and D3=0 otherwise   
Creditor rights (D4) The index is formed taking into account (1) the country imposes restrictions 
such as creditor’s consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization, 
(2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the 
reorganization petition has been approved, (3) secured creditors are ranked 
first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the 
assets of a bankrupt firm, (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of 
its property pending the resolution of the reorganization.  A score is 
calculated by adding one for each of these characteristics.  The index ranges 
from 0 to 4. Our sample shows a similar range.  
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998, Levine et al 2000, 
Levine 1998, Beck et al 2000 and 
Gonźalez 2005 
Bankruptcy and 
reorganization laws 
Anti-director rights (D5) Legal protection for minority shareholders is calculated taking into account 
whether a country protects minority shareholders, has one share-one vote 
score, allows proxy by mail allowed, shares are not blocked before meeting, 
allows cumulative voting, rights exist for oppressed minority, allows 
preemptive rights to new issue, a percentage of share capital allowed to call 
an extraordinary shareholder meeting. These six creditor rights are scored (1 
if allowed or 0) and added to give an aggregate score. The anti-director rights 
index ranges from 0 to 6. In our sample it ranges from 0 to 5.  
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998 and Gonźalez 2005. 
Company law or 
commercial code 
This table defines risk measures as well as bank specific and country specific variables used in analysis. The variable column presents the dependent variables, explanatory 
variables and control variables used in the models.  The dependent variables consist of four alternate equity based risk measures which are the total risk, systematic risk, interest 
rate risk, idiosyncratic risk and a variable to capture credit risk. The base model for study includes uninsured deposits, charter value, bank capital and bank capital squared, off-
balance sheet activities, loan to total assets and control variables such as size and economic freedom index. The extended model includes the additional variables, operating 
leverage, dividend yield, ownership dummy, legal origin dummy, geographical dummy, creditor rights index and anti-director rights index. The table also presents potential 
references for these variables and the source of data. 
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Appendix 2 
Definition of instrumental variables for two-stage least square regression 
 
Instrumental variables: Base model Definition 
Lag of operating leverage  Fixed assets or tangible assets/total assets)t-1  
Lag of market discipline  ((Subordinated debt+ inter-bank deposits)/total liabilities) t-1 
Lag of charter value ((market value of equity +book value of liabilities)/book value of total 
assets) t-1 
Lag of bank capital (Equity/total assets) t-1 
Lag of bank capital squared ((Equity/total assets)^2) t-1 
Lag of off balance sheet activities (Total contingent liabilities/total liabilities) t-1 
Lag of loan to total assets  (Net loans/total assets) t-1 
Lag of size (Natural logarithm of total market value of equity) t-1 
Lag of deposit to total liabilities (Total deposit to total liabilities) t-1 
Diversification benefit (Net fee and commission income/Net interest income) t-1 
Efficiency ratio (Cost to income ratio) t-1 
Profitability ratio (Rate of return on Average Assets) t-1 
Net interest margin (Net interest margin) t-1 
Economic freedom index As mentioned in Appendix 1 
Year dummies Year dummies from 1996-2006 
Instrumental variables: Extended 
model 
 
Ownership dummy As mentioned in Appendix 1 
Geographical proximity dummy As mentioned in Appendix 1 
Legal origin dummy As mentioned in Appendix 1 
Creditor rights dummy As mentioned in Appendix 1 
Anti-director rights As mentioned in Appendix 1 
Stock market turnover ratio Ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market 
capitalization, the denominator is deflated using the following method:  
Tt/P_at/{(0.5)*[Mt/P_et + Mt-1/P_et-1] where T is total value traded, M is 
stock market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI P_a is average 
annual CPI (Source: Thorsten B., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. 
2000).
This table represents the instrumental variables used in the two stage least square regression model. In our 
analysis we consider charter value, bank capital and bank capital squared to be the endogenous variables. 
Our instrumental variables for the base model are: lag of charter value, lag of bank capital, lag of bank 
capital squared, lag of market discipline (uninsured deposits), lag of off-balance sheet activities, lag of loan 
to total assets, lag of size, lag of deposit to total liabilities, lag of diversification benefit, lag of efficiency 
ratio, lag of profitability ratio, lag of net interest margin, economic freedom index and year dummies. For 
the extended variables the instrumental variables are the same as the base model, in addition we take the 
following variables as instrumental variables: ownership dummy, legal origin dummy, geographical 
proximity dummy, creditor rights dummy, anti-director rights dummy and stock market turnover ratio.   
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Table 1  
Sample composition 
Country  Bank Holding  
Company 
Commercial banks Co-operatives Savings 
bank 
Total 
Euro zone countries      
Belgium 1 0 0 0 1 
Finland 0 2 0 0 2 
France 0 6 0 0 6 
Germany 0 3 0 0 3 
Greece 0 7 0 0 7 
Ireland 0 3 0 0 3 
Italy 0 1 0 6 7 
Netherlands 0 1 0 0 1 
Portugal 2 0 0 0 2 
Spain 0 6 0 1 7 
Total 3 29 0 7 39 
Non euro zone countries      
Denmark 0 36 0 0 36 
Norway 0 0 0 3 3 
Sweden 0 1 0 0 1 
Switzerland 1 0 1 2 4 
United Kingdom 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 2 37 1 5 45 
Total number of listed shares for 
both Euro-zone and non-euro-zone 
countries 
5 66 1 12 84 
The sample includes 84 listed bank shares from both euro-zone and non-euro-zone European countries. 
These includes bank holding companies, commercial banks, savings banks and co-operatives from 
Belgium, Finland, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The complete sample is dominated by commercial 
banks followed by savings banks, bank holding companies and cooperatives. The total number of banks in 
euro-zone countries stands at 39 which include 3 bank holding companies, 29 commercial banks, no 
cooperatives and 7 savings banks. The total number of banks in non-euro-zone European countries stands 
at 45, comprising of 2 bank holding companies, 37 commercial banks, 1 co-operative and 5 savings banks. 
The non-euro-zone commercial bank sample is dominated by Danish banks.  
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Panel A Descriptive statistics of bank risk measures 
 Mean Std. dev Min Max Skew Kurt 
Credit risk 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.06 3.57 27.63 
Systematic risk 0.39 0.50 -1.27 3.32 0.99 1.35 
Natural log of total risk -7.35 1.23 -12.01 -3.37 -0.19 0.53 
Interest rate  risk  0.173 0.20 0.00 2.11 2.98 16.00 
Natural log of idiosyncratic risk -7.62 1.10 -12.05 -3.40 -0.18 1.38 
 
 
Panel B Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
 Mean Std. dev Min Max Skew Kurt 
Dividend yield 3.00 1.97 0 13.16 1.43 3.37 
Operating leverage  0.02 0.20 0.00 5.71 28.86 835.08 
Uninsured deposits 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.97 2.53 10.56 
Charter value 1.02 0.07 0.87 1.79 4.41 35.68 
Bank capital 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.95 6.38 84.13 
Bank capital squared 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.90 20.40 447.46 
Off balance sheet activities 0.52 1.37 0.01 21.51 9.98 126.99 
Loan to total assets  0.60 0.15 0.01 0.92 -0.65 0.85 
Size 5.77 2.50 1.17 11.33 0.36 -0.91 
Economic freedom index 68.65 5.77 55.60 82.40 0.00 -0.67 
Bank specialization dummy 0.77 0.42 0 1 -1.31 -0.28 
Legal origin dummy 3.04 1.03 1 4 -0.33 -1.51 
Euro-zone dummy 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.14 -1.98 
Creditor rights index 2.12 1.01 0 4 -0.59 -0.82 
Anti-director rights index 2.35 0.96 0 5 0.57 0.03 
This table presents descriptive statistics for bank risks and explanatory variables. The study uses annual 
observations of bank specific variables and time invariant variables for listed bank shares in euro-zone and 
non-euro-zone countries. The total number of observations across the sample is 840, with 10 years of date 
for 84 banks. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of bank equity risk, interest rate risk and credit risk. 
The total risk and idiosyncratic risk are expressed in terms of natural logs as the log values for these risk 
measures are used in the following analysis.  Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the bank specific 
and country specific variables. Variables are defined in Table 2. (N = 840) 
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Table 3  
The determinants of bank risks 
 
Panel A Pooled-OLS and Two-stage least square for base model 
 
    Pooled-OLS regression result     Two-Stage Least Square regression result 
 Credit risk Systematic  risk Total risk Interest rate 
 risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Credit  
risk 
Systematic   
risk 
Total  
risk 
Interest rate 
 risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Intercept 0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.746*** 
(0.206) 
-5.990*** 
(0.615) 
0.370*** 
(0.117) 
-6.314*** 
(0.614) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.617*** 
(0.250) 
-3.494*** 
(0.490) 
-0.032 
(0.178) 
3.728*** 
(.310) 
Uninsured deposits  0.001*** 
(0.018)† 
-0.050*** 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.042) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.070* 
(0.041) 
0.004† 
(0.028)† 
-0.042*** 
(0.019) 
0.034 
(0.041) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
0.056* 
(0.031) 
Charter value -0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.505** 
(0.208) 
3.691*** 
(0.610) 
0.204 
(0.173) 
3.091*** 
(0.627) 
0.005† 
(0.004) 
0.603* 
(0.367) 
2.926*** 
(0.586) 
-0.221 
(0.295) 
2.614*** 
(0.382) 
Bank capital -0.031† 
(0.042)† 
-0.131** 
(0.059) 
-0.097 
(0.146) 
-0.002 
(0.033) 
-0.010 
(0.155) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.122 
(0.096) 
-0.290* 
(0.167) 
-0.005 
(0.067) 
-0.203* 
(0.119) 
Bank capital 
squared 
0.146***† 
(0.045)† 
0.086** 
(0.036) 
-0.166* 
(0.092) 
-0.033 
(0.020) 
-0.186** 
(0.096) 
-0.012† 
(0.010)† 
-0.025 
(0.044) 
-0.115* 
(0.064) 
0.010 
(0.030) 
-0.098** 
(0.050) 
Off-balance sheet 
activities 
0.033***† 
(0.013)† 
0.050*** 
(0.012) 
0.106*** 
(0.030) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.067** 
(0.030) 
0.063***† 
(0.016)† 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
0.084*** 
(0.025) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.067*** 
(0.015) 
Loan to total assets 0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.218*** 
(0.073) 
-0.588** 
(0.246) 
0.025 
(0.045) 
-0.235 
(0.242) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.245*** 
(0.079) 
-0.162 
(0.196) 
-0.012 
(0.062) 
0.032 
(0.124) 
Size -0.032***† 
(0.011)† 
0.149*** 
(0.008) 
0.087*** 
(0.028) 
-0.041† 
(0.006) 
-0.026 
(0.028) 
-0.040***† 
(0.015)† 
0.148*** 
(0.011) 
-0.008† 
(0.020) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.053*** 
(0.014) 
Economic freedom  
index 
-0.007*† 
(0.004)† 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.041*** 
(0.007) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.034*** 
(0.007) 
0.003† 
(0.003)† 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.038† 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Year dummy 1996-
2006 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj R2 
Model test 
Breusch Pagan χ2 
Joint F-test for year 
dummies  
Number of obs. 
0.20 
F[17,822]=14 
558.70 
2.48 
Prob(0.000) 
840 
0.57 
F[17,822]=69 
257.32 
7.61 
Prob(0.000) 
840 
0.30 
F[17,822]=23 
103.87 
6.91 
Prob(0.000) 
840 
0.07 
F[17,822]=5 
356.60 
1.89 
Prob(0.000) 
840 
0.17 
F[17,822]=11 
100.44 
5.32 
Prob(0.000) 
840 
0.078 
F[17,805]=5 
- 
0.34 
Prob.(0.961) 
823 
0.57 
F[17,822]=69 
- 
6.87 
Prob(0.000) 
826 
 
-0.57 
- 
- 
5.70 
Prob(0.000) 
826 
0.05 
F[17,808]=4 
- 
3.18 
Prob.(0.000) 
826 
.16 
F[17,808]=10 
- 
3.93 
Prob.(0.000) 
826 
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Panel B Pooled-OLS and Two-stage least square for extended model 
 
 Pooled-OLS regression result Two-stage least squares regression result 
 Credit risk Systematic  
 risk 
Total risk Interest rate 
 risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Credit risk Systematic risk Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Intercept 0.027*** 
(0.004) 
1.125*** 
(0.266) 
-8.251*** 
(0.781) 
0.105 
(0.162) 
-8.665*** 
(0.762) 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
1.050** 
(0.538) 
-5.027*** 
(0.624) 
0.154 
(0.352) 
-6.507*** 
(0.749) 
Operating leverage  0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.021) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
0.020† 
(0.049)† 
0.001 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.032) 
-0.004* 
(0.017) 
-0.004 
(0.036) 
Dividend yield 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.021 
(0.022) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.114** 
(0.052) 
0.101 
(0.065) 
-0.057 
(0.031) 
0.127*** 
(0.048) 
Uninsured deposits  0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.044*** 
(0.014) 
-0.020 
(0.038) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
0.036 
(0.037) 
0.020† 
(0.047)† 
-0.005 
(0.025) 
0.035 
(0.036) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
0.037 
(0.039) 
Charter value -0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.264 
(0.221) 
2.202*** 
(0.585) 
-0.046 
(0.188) 
1.695*** 
(0.622) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.941* 
(0.506) 
2.854*** 
(0.640) 
-0.662* 
(0.397) 
3.132*** 
(0.707) 
Bank capital 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.127* 
(0.069) 
-0.352** 
(0.164) 
-0.049 
(0.036) 
-0.356** 
(0.169) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.242 
(0.204) 
-0.689*** 
(0.235) 
0.069 
(0.135) 
-1.284*** 
(0.274) 
Bank capital 
squared 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.069* 
(0.039) 
0.038 
(0.094) 
-0.006 
(0.021) 
0.022 
(0.098) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.106 
(0.095) 
0.302*** 
(0.109) 
-0.046 
(0.062) 
0.447*** 
(0.131) 
Off balance sheet  
activities 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.013) 
0.219*** 
(0.033) 
0.013** 
(0.007) 
0.176*** 
(0.033) 
0.085***† 
(0.031)† 
0.091*** 
(0.022) 
0.129*** 
(0.024) 
-0.029*** 
(0.013) 
0.122*** 
(0.023) 
Loan to total assets  0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.191** 
(0.082) 
-0.500** 
(0.243) 
0.041 
(0.045) 
-0.191 
(0.239) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.398*** 
(0.111) 
-0.230 
(0.170) 
0.146* 
(0.085) 
-0.064 
(0.185) 
Size -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.130*** 
(0.010) 
0.039 
(0.027) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.071*** 
(0.027) 
-0.001*** 
(0.031)† 
0.111*** 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.022) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.080*** 
(0.022) 
Economic freedom 
index 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
Ownership  
dummy D1 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.084** 
(0.034) 
0.043 
(0.091) 
0.009 
(0.019) 
-0.051 
 (0.087) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.145** 
(0.061) 
0.073 
(0.073) 
0.012 
(0.038) 
0.087 
(0.074) 
Legal origin  
dummy D2 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.157*** 
(0.072) 
-0.015* 
(0.063) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
0.040 
(0.063) 
-0.003*** 
(0.073)† 
-0.232*** 
(0.523) 
0.007 
(0.062) 
0.006 
(0.036) 
0.032 
(0.062) 
Geographical 
dummy D3 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.184*** 
(0.047) 
0.560*** 
(0.137) 
0.082*** 
(0.028) 
0.656*** 
(0.134) 
0.047 
(0.228) 
-0.268*** 
(0.080) 
0.348*** 
(0.096) 
-0.024 
(0.057) 
0.519*** 
(0.133) 
Creditor rights  
dummy D4 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.202*** 
(0.049) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.160*** 
(0.048) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.030) 
-0.069** 
(0.034) 
-0.002 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.037) 
Anti-director rights 
 D5 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.033* 
(0.020) 
0.150*** 
(0.046) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.184*** 
(0.044) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.105*** 
(0.040) 
-0.035 
(0.048) 
0.021 
(0.026) 
-0.048 
(0.043) 
Year Dummy 96-05 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj R2 
Model test 
Breusch Pagan χ2 
Joint F-test for year 
dummies 
Number of obs. 
0.21 
F[24,814]=12 
809.62 
F(9,815)=3 
Prob(0.005) 
840 
0.60 
F[24,814]=52 
410.80 
F(9,815)=7 
Prob(0.000) 
840 
0.37 
F[24,814]=22 
111.43 
F(9,815)=8 
Prob(0.000) 
840 
0.10 
F[24, 814]=5 
514.08 
F(9,815)=2 
Prob(0.021) 
840 
0.24 
F[24,814]=12 
114.27 
F(9,815)=6 
Prob(0.000) 
840 
-0.80 
- 
- 
F(9,815)=.34 
Prob(0.962) 
824 
0.50 
F[24,802]=35 
- 
F(9,815)=6 
Prob(0.000) 
827 
0.18 
F[24,802]=9 
- 
F(9,815)=7 
Prob(0.000) 
827 
-0.05 
- 
- 
F(9,815)=3 
Prob(0.000) 
827 
-0.36 
- 
- 
F(9,815)=5 
Prob(0.000) 
827 
 50
The tables in Panel A and Panel B represents the pooled-OLS regression and two stage least squares regression results to estimate the base and extended models 
of bank risk.  
The variables are defined in Appendix 1. The details of the instrumental variables are presented in Appendix 2. The joint F-test refers to a test for statistical 
significance of the year dummies. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity and adjusted standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
***significant at 1% significance level, **significant at 5% significance level, *significant at 10% significance level. 
† the coefficients of the explanatory variables  and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
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Table 4  
Impact of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on bank equity risk, interest rate risk and credit risk 
 
   Credit risk   Systematic risk  Total risk   Interest rate risk  Idiosyncratic risk 
 Pre EMU Difference Pre EMU Difference Pre EMU Difference Pre EMU Difference Pre EMU Difference 
Intercept 0.004 
(0.003) 
- 0.409 
(0.372) 
- -5.401*** 
(1.292) 
- -0.128 
(0.170) 
- -5.120 
(1.250) 
- 
Uninsured deposits 0.044*† 
 (0.026)† 
0.029† 
(0.036)† 
-0.041 
(0.028) 
-0.017 
(0.032) 
0.017 
(0.058) 
-0.021 
(0.084) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.069 
(0.056) 
-0.006 
(0.082) 
Charter value -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
1.711*** 
(0.566) 
-1.431** 
(0.611) 
5.806*** 
(1.735) 
-2.768 
(1.844) 
0.529* 
(0.283) 
-0.394 
(0.343) 
5.273*** 
(1.693) 
-2.829 
(1.818) 
Bank capital 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.101 
(0.119) 
-0.276** 
(0.136) 
-0.123 
(0.317) 
0.099 
(0.354) 
0.063 
(0.106) 
-0.079 
(0.111) 
-0.234 
(0.294) 
0.223 
(0.342) 
Bank capital 
squared 
0.007† 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.064 
(0.067) 
0.182** 
(0.078) 
-0.327* 
(.194) 
0.227 
(0.219) 
-0.096* 
(0.055) 
0.082 
(0.060) 
-0.239 
(0.186) 
0.085 
(0.215) 
Off balance sheet 
activities 
0.001*** 
(0.014)† 
-0.001*** 
(0.024)† 
0.046*** 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.023) 
0.065 
(0.052) 
0.066 
(0.063) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.040 
(0.050) 
0.050 
(0.062) 
Loan to total assets 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.394*** 
(0.137) 
0.220 
(0.162) 
-1.011** 
(0.422) 
0.692 
(0.522) 
0.048 
(0.080) 
-0.053 
(0.098) 
-0.674* 
(0.405) 
0.734 
(0.507) 
Size -0.001*** 
(0.021)† 
0.001** 
(0.025)† 
0.130*** 
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.050) 
0.125** 
(0.059) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.099** 
(0.047) 
0.115* 
(0.058) 
Economic freedom  
index 
0.009*† 
(0.005)† 
-
0.022***† 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.054*** 
(0.016) 
0.020 
(0.018) 
0.005† 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.053*** 
(0.016) 
0.027 
(0.018) 
Year dummy 1996-
2005 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adj R2 
Model test 
Breusch Pagan χ2 
Lagrange Multiplier 
test 
Wald test for joint 
significance for 
differences 
Joint significance 
for year dummies 
0.22 
F[25,814]=11 
648.57 
58.66*** 
 
 
 
 
5.53 
 
 
 
 
 
3.62 
0.57 
F[25,814]=46 
278.65 
406.89*** 
 
 
 
 
1.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.25 
0.31 
F[25,814]=16 
145.194 
384.89*** 
 
 
 
 
5.24 
 
 
 
 
 
1.35 
 
0.08 
F[25,814]=4 
454.54 
57.24*** 
 
 
 
 
2.89 
 
 
 
 
 
2.35 
0.17 
F[25,814]=8 
134.186 
320*** 
 
 
 
 
4.65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.32 
This table represents the impact of EMU on bank equity risk and credit risk. Pooled-OLS is used in estimation of these models as per equation (6). Variables are 
defined in Table 2. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity and the adjusted standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***significant at 1% significance 
level, **significant at 5% significance level, *significant at 10% significance level.   
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† the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
 
